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INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS
EDITED BY DAVID J. BEDERMAN
African Court on Human and Peoples'Rights-jurisdiction-individual human rights complaints proce-
dure-forum prorogatum as a basis forjurisdiction- costs
MICHELOT YOGOGOMBAYE V. REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL. App. No. 001/2008. Judgment. At http://
www.african-court.org/en/cases/latest-judgments/.
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, December 15, 2009.
On December 15,2009, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, based inArusha,
Tanzania, rendered its historic first judgment.' In a short ruling accompanied by a separate
opinion by Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz, the Court unanimously 2 dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction (paras. 37, 46; sep. op. Ouguergouz, J., para. 1).
The applicant, Michelot Yogogombaye, is a Chadian living in Switzerland (Yogogombaye,
para. 1). On August 11, 2008, he initiated proceedings against Senegal, seeking an order to
prevent Senegalese authorities from prosecuting former President Hissein Habr63 (id.). Habr6,
who ruled Chad for eight years, sought asylum in Senegal, a neighboring West African country,
after he was deposed in December 1990 (para. 18). He is allegedly responsible for ordering the
torture and deaths of up to forty thousand Chadians during his eight years in office. 4
Yogogombaye sought to establish the Court's jurisdiction over the case. He claimed that
Senegal, as a member of the African Union 5 (AU) and as party to the Protocol on the Estab-
lishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights" (Protocol), had filed a decla-
ration pursuant to Article 34(6) of the Protocol allowing the Court to hear human rights peti-
tions initiated by individuals (para. 17).
'Yogogombaye v. Republic of Senegal, App. No. 001/2008, Judgment (Afr. Ct. Hum. & Peoples' Rts. Dec. 15,
2009), available athttp://www.african-court.orglen/cases/latest-j udgments/. It should be noted that the Court calls
rulings on preliminary matters concerning jurisdiction "Judgments," rather than "Decisions," the term used by
most international courts.
2 The following nine judges signed the opinion: Jean Mutsinzi, Sophia A. B. Akuffo, Justina K. Mafoso-Guni,
Bernard M. Ngoepe, Hamdi Faraj Fannoush, Modibo Tounty Guindo, G6rard Niyungeko, Fatsah Ouguergouz,
and Joseph N. Mulenga. As required by Court rules, the Senegalese judge El Hadj Guiss6 recused himself. See
Yogogombaye, para. 2.
3 The first name of the former Chadian President is variously spelled Hissein, Hissen, Hissane, Hissene, and
Hissane. His last name is spelled Habre or Habr. This case note uses the Court's spelling: Hissein Habr6.
' A Chadian inquiry concluded that, in addition to those allegedly killed, up to 80,000 orphans, 30,000 widows,
and 200,000 people were victimized by Habr6. See Stephen P. Marks, The Hissine Habr6 Case: TheLawandPolitics
ofUniversalfurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERI-
OUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 131, 135 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).
' ConstitutiveAct of theAfrican Union,July 11, 2000,2158 UNTS 3. This and otherAfrican Union documents
are available online at http://www.africa-union.org.
6 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights, June 10, 1998, Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) (entered into force Jan.
25, 2004) [hereinafter Protocol].
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In his application, Yogogombaye made two substantive allegations. First, he asserted that
Chadian victims had filed complaints with Senegalese authorities in 2000, alleging Habr6's
complicity in crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture during his presidency (para.
18). Six years later, in July 2006, the AU mandated that Senegal either take steps to resolve the
matter or find an "African option" to the "problem" posed by the prosecution of Habr& (para.
19). Thereafter, on July 23, 2008, the Senegalese parliament adopted a constitutional amend-
ment authorizing the retroactive application of its relevant law, solely to enable this trial (para.
20). In Yogogombaye's view, Senegal's action violated the "sacrosanct" rule against retroactive
application of the criminal law and was therefore inconsistent with both its Constitution and
Article 7(2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 7 (para. 21). Second, he
alleged that Senegal wrongly opted for a "judicial" instead of an "African" solution inspired by
African tradition (para. 22). For example, it could have used traditional African conflict res-
olution mechanisms like ubuntu, which promotes reconciliation through dialogue and repa-
rations. Consequently, Senegal's actions had amply demonstrated its intention to abuse, for
political and financial gain, the mandate entrusted to it by the AU (id ).'8
Yogogombaye advanced various subsidiary legal and political arguments. He claimed, inter
alia, that Senegal had violated other African human rights instruments and abused the universal
jurisdiction principle, which could have a "destabilizing effect" on the political, economic,
social, and cultural development of Chad and other countries in the continent (para. 23(3), (4),
(8)). Similarly, he asked not only for orders directing Chadian and Senegalese authorities to
jointly establish a South African-style truth commission to address, in an "African manner,"
the crimes committed in Chad between 1962 and 2008, but also for a declaration that the
charges against Habr6 had been "abusively used" by Senegal, France, and Human Rights
Watch-as evidenced by the ''media hype into which they turned . .. the said allegations"~
(para. 23(7), (10), (01)). Ultimately, among his various requests for relief, he asked that the
Court suspend or terminate the AU's July 2006 mandate that Senegal prosecute Habr&
(para. 23(2), (9)).
In response, Senegal, after initially requesting an extension of time that the Court granted,
contested the admissibility of the complaint (paras. 9-12).9 It argued that, contrary to the
applicant's claims, it had not filed the Article 34(6) declaration accepting the Court's jurisdic-
tion over cases directly initiated by individuals (para. 25). Alternatively, on the merits, Senegal
7 Article 7(2) provides:
No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally punishable offence at the
time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted for an offence for which no provision was made at the time
it was committed. Punishment is personal and can be imposed only on the offender.
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Art. 7(2), June 27, 198 1, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG.67/3 rev. 5, 21
ILM 58 (1982).
8 Yogogombaye claimed that, by choosing to prosecute Habr6 and by asking for the AU's financial support to
do so, Senegal's "pecuniary motivation" would be lucrative at 40 billion CFA francs (approximately $38 million)
(para. 23(6)). This incentive would, in his view, set a bad precedent fot other African states where former heads of
states may seek refuge.
" Senegal wrote the Court on February 17, 2009, requesting rime to prepare a reply. That request was, granted,
by an order dated March 6, 2009, providing Senegal with a deadline ofApril 14,2009 (paras. 9-i10). TheJudgment
noted that Senegal filed its "statement of defence within the time limit," but the date was not specified (para. 12).
No indication was given that the order issued by the Court was confidential. Concerns therefore arise about the lack
of transparency in the proceedings because, so far, the order has not been published.
62120101
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averred that the Habr6 case concerned only itself and Habr&'s alleged victims, in light of obli-
gations owed under the Convention Against Torture"0 (para. 26); Yogogombaye therefore
lacked a "legitimate interest" to initiate proceedings (id). Furthermore, Senegal denied the
purported violations of the nonrerroactiviry principle and the AU mandate to prosecute Habr6
(para. 27). Accordingly, it requested that the Court declare the case inadmissible because the
applicant lacked standing to institute a complaint and, on the substance, dismiss the complaint
because the evidence he had adduced was "baseless and incompetent" (para. 28).
Given the simple facts of the case, the judges deemed a public hearing unnecessary. They
therefore moved to deliberations (para. 16). In its judgment, the Court analyzed the relevant
statutory provisions and rules.1 ' It explained that, to hear a case initiated directly by an indi-
vidual against a state party, the requirements of Articles 5(3) and 34(6) of the Protocol must
be met (para. 3 1). Article 5 (3) provides that the "Court may entitle relevant Non-Governmen-
tal Organizations (NGOs) with observer status before the [African] Commission [on Human
and Peoples' Rights] and individuals to institute cases directly before it, in accordance with Arti-
cle 34(6) of this Protocol" (para. 32, emphasis added). In turn, Article 34(6) states:
At the time of ratification of this Protocol or any time thereafter, the State shall make a dec-
laration accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases under Article 5 (3) of this
Protocol. The Court shall not receive any petition under Article 5 (3) involving a State Parry
which has not made such a declaration. (Para. 33, emphasis added)
These two provisions, read together, confirm that direct individual access to the Court is sub-
ject to a precondition: the respondent state must have deposited an Article 34(6) declaration
vesting the Court with jurisdiction to hear such cases (para. 34).
In this case, the simple- but contentious- question was whether Senegal, as a party to the
Protocol, had entered such a declaration (para. 35). To resolve the issue, the Court had
requested the chair of the AU Commission, the depository of the treaty, to provide the list of
African states parties that had accepted the Court's competence over direct individual com-
plaints (para. 36). That list confirmed Senegal's stance that it had not submitted an Article
34(6) declaration. Consequently, the Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
Yogogombaye's application (para. 37). Given this conclusion, it was unnecessary to consider
the secondary question of inadmissibility, which, though Senegal had framed it that way, was
a preliminary objection pertaining to lack of jurisdiction (para. 38).
Finally, the Court addressed costs. Yogogombaye, who represented himself, requested "the
benefit of free proceedings" (paras. 23(12), 42). Senegal was represented by five lawyers. It
therefore asked for the applicant to bear its expenses (paras. 28, 43). The judges noted their
default rule requiring each parry to absorb its costs (para. 44)2 The circumstances of this case
did not warrant any exception (para. 45).
'0 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec.
10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 UNTS 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
"1 The Court cited Article 3(2) of the Protocol and Rules 26(2), 39(1), and 52(7) of the Interim Rules of the Court
(paras. 29-30). See Interim Rules of the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, June 20, 2008, available at
http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/contenrfiles/files/InterimRules-ofCourt..ENG.pdf.
12 See id
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The dream for a robust regional human rights court in Africa dates back to the early 1960s. 1 3
However, it took almost forty years, a wave of democratization in the early 1990s, the end of
the Cold War, and the establishment of new judicial institutions at the international level to
shame continental leaders into attempting to fix the glaring deficiencies of the largely ineffec-
tual African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (Commission) based in Banjul,
Gambia. " While the Commission could adjudicate human rights complaints brought by indi-
viduals and NGOs against African states, it was severely constrained by its slow institutional
start, confidential procedures, lack of power to issue binding decisions, and dearth of requisite
resources to do its work.'"
Unlike the well-regarded European and Inter-American systems, the African human rights
system has benconsigned to the "least developed or effective"' category. According to a lead-
ing commentator, by the mid- 1990Os, the African system was such a "disappointment, if not
embarrassment for the continent,"'17 that leaders approved the processes culminating in the
adoption of the Protocol, which established the Court in June 1998. That development rekin-
dled hope of a new dawn for traditional enforcement of individual human rights in Africa. But,
perhaps portending what was to come, it took almost six years to achieve the fifteen ratifications
required for the Protocol's entry into force on January 25, 2004.'18 It took another two years
(until 2006) for the judges to be elected, and still another two years (in 2008) for the Court
to finally find a home in Tanzania.' 9
Against this backdrop, this first judgment is a noteworthy step for the Court. In a continent
rife with human rights violations, the judgment marks the beginning of an era in which African
states, individuals, and NGOs may have disagreements about important human rights matters
adjudicated by this regional court.
The years of delay20 leading up to this first judgment highlight the fundamental flaw in the
Court's jurisdiction over contentious matters. States parties and certain African intergovern-
mental bodies may all channel cases to the Court. However, individuals and NGOs may only
bring direct complaints against African governments after apparently crossing two major hur-
dles: (1) convincing the Court to exercise its discretion to hear the case; and (2) showing that
13 See FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 420 -22 (2007); Christof Heyns,
The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 679, 68 1- 85 (2004).
14 See VILJOEN, supra note 13, at 420 -22; Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights Court: A Two-Leggea'Stool?
21 HUMAN RTS. Q. 342, 351 (1999). Information about the Commission is available on its Web site, http:ll
www.achpr.org/english/-info/mandate-en.html.
15 For an analysis of the various problems, see Mutua, supra note 14, at 343- 44; Chidi Anseim Odinkalu, The
Individual Complaints Procedures oftheAfrican Commission on Human and Peoples 'Rights: A Preliminary Assessment,
8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 359,365 (1998); Richard Gittleman, The African Charter on Human and
Peoples'Rights: A LegalAnalysis, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 667 (1982); Cees Flinterman & Evelyn Ankumah, The African
Charter on Human and Peoples'Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 159 (Hurst
Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992).
16 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 920 (Henryj. Steiner & Philip
Alston eds., 2d ed. 2000).
17 Mutua, supra note 14, at 352.
18 VILIOEN, supra note 13, at 422-23.
19 Id. at 431-36.
20 GEORGE MUKUNDI WACHIRA, AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: TEN YEARS ON
AND STILL NO JUSTICE 2 (2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/48e4763c2.pdif (lamenting
the Court's failure to heat a single case a decade after its formal creation).
20101 623
624 ~THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW[Vl10
the relevant state had filed a declaration accepting such jurisdiction."' Only Burkina Faso,
Malawi, Mali, and Tanzania have filed such declarations.2 Otherwise, individuals may bring
cases only indirectly: through their home states or the Commission .2 ' Both these mechanisms
have so far languished in desuetude because neither African states nor the Commission has
proved willing to refer cases to the Court.
Though imperfect, one way to overcome the limited direct individual and NGO access to
the Court is through creative judicial interpretation. In their first ruling, the judges did not shy
away from that monumental challenge, as seen in their interpretation of the relevant legal pro-
visions as well as their liberal treatment of Yogogombaye's application.
The judgment begins by highlighting that Article 3 specifies that, in the event of a dispute
between parties over jurisdiction, "the Court shall decide" (para. 30). The purpose of citing
that provision, which reaffirms the established comp~tence de Ia comfrtence doctrine, is arguably
to underscore judicial primacy in resolving questions of jurisdiction in cases of doubt as to its
existence.
The majority also noted the second sentence ofArticle 34(6) of the Protocol, which provides
that the Court "shall not receive any petition under Article 5(3) involving a State Party which
has not made such a declaration" (para. 39). However, the judges underscored that "receive"
is not to be understood in a literal (physical) or technical (admissibility) sense, but rather, as
denoting "the conditions under which the Court could hear such cases" (id., emphasis added).
In other words, while the letter and spirit of Article 34(6), read as a whole, indicate that the
concerned state must consent to direct individual and NGO complaints, nothing prevents the
Court from physically receiving such petitions. This interpretation implies that African indi-
viduals and NGOs may still attempt to initiate complaints directly. If the respondent state chal-
lenges the Court's jurisdiction, the Court will decide whether it may hear the matter in light
of Articles 5(3) and 34(6), as well as the specific positions taken by the parties.
This reading of the judgment is confirmed by the separate opinion of Judge Ouguer-
gouz, who helpfully placed the facts of the case in a new light and emphasized their sig-
nificance. As he explained, the majority reached the inevitable conclusion that the Court
lacked jurisdiction to hear Yogogombaye's application against Senegal. However, he noted
2" Article 5(3) of the Protocol provides that the Court "may entitle" NGOs with observer status before the Com-
mission to initiate cases, as well as individuals to do so directly (consistent with Article 34(6)). Viljoen has argued
the phrase may entitle is a drafting anomaly. It was not intended to confer discretion for the Court to reject a case.
Otherwise, it places an "unduly heavy burden on individuals." This author agrees with Viljoen that formalistic inter-
pretations of this provision should be avoided to enhance individual and NGO access to the Court. See VILJOEN,
supra note 13, at 443.
22 AsJudge Ouguergouz notes in his separate opinion, the chair of the AU Commission, depository of the treaty,
only lists on the AU Commission's Web site the states parties to the Protocol; reference to states that have lodged
the Article 34(6) declaration accepting automatic individual and NGO complaints has been omitted. In addition,
unlike similar international judicial institutions, the Protocol does not require the list to be transmitted to the Court
(sep. op. Ouguergouz, J., paras. 41-42). A simple remedy would be for the depository to regularly provide an
updated list to the Court which, in turn, could post it online to inform prospective complainants. Regrettably, as
of writing, this process has not yet been put in place. Recently, however, the Court identified these four countries
as recognizing its authority to hear petitions filed by individuals and NGOs. See Press Release, African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights, Opening Ceremony of the 18th Ordinary Session (Sept. 20, 20 10), at http://www.
africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/20 10/september/pr/Presse%20Release%200pening/o201l8%200rdinariy
%20session%2oP/o2the2Affcan2Court20%/20Sep..Eng.pdf
23 Article 5 of the Protocol establishes the various ways to access the Court. In addition to jurisdiction over con-
tentious matters, the Court has wide advisory jurisdiction.
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that the majority reasoning is oversimplified because it referred, without detailed analysis,
to Articles 5(3) and 34(6) of the Protocol. Though fundamentally important to personal
jurisdiction, those two provisions must be read in their context. Doing so required that
a distinction be drawn between concerns about access to the Court (Article 5) and its overall
jurisdiction (Article 3) (sep. op. Ouguergouz, J., paras. 10 -11). Ultimately, that distinc-
tion explains (1) why the Court did not reject the application through a simple letter given
its "manifest lack of jurisdiction"; and (2) why, instead, it ruled on the application by way
of "a very solemn judgment" (id., para. 12).
Indeed, according to judge Ouguergouz, the majoritys discussion of jurisdiction did not
"faithfully reflect the Court's liberal approach to the treatment of the application" (sep. op.
Ouguergouz, J., para. 9). Senegalese officials had corresponded twice with the Court registry
(id., paras. 18 -19; Yogogombaye, paras. 5, 8-9). Instead of unequivocally challenging jurisdic-
tion, Senegal, through notification of the names of its lawyers and subsequent request for exten-
sion of time to prepare a reply, "left open the possibility, however slim, that it might accept the
jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the application" (sep. op. Ouguergouz, J., para. 20). This
prospect raised doubts for the judges as to whether the country would appear to (1) contest
jurisdiction; (2) challenge the admissibility of the application; or (3) defend itself on the merits
(id., para. 18).
Furthermore, the separate opinion implicitly criticized the reasoning of the majority. It
explained the principles underlying jurisdiction-namely consent and sovereignty-to show
the legal basis of the Court leaving that door open for Senegal's potential endorsement ofjuris-
diction. Judge Ouguergouz closely analyzed Article 34(6), which is ambiguous in critical
respects (sep. op. Ouguergouz, J., paras. 24-26). As he noted, the provision uses "shall" which
suggests that states parties are required to submit a declaration accepting direct individual and
NGO complaints (para. 25). Despite such language, however, a state's decision to confer such
jurisdiction on the Court is optional because no deadline was imposed for filing such a dec-
laration (id, para. 26). In addition, the second sentence of Article 34(6), read together with
Article 5 (3), barred the Court from hearing a case involving a state party that has not entered
such a declaration. This conclusion was corroborated by the Protocol's travauxpr'paratoires
(id., paras. 25-26).
judge Ouguergouz, correctly observed that Article 34(6) raises another important question
that should have also been answered by the majority opinion: whether filing the optional dec-
laration is the only way for a state to recognize the Court's jurisdiction over complaints brought
by individuals (sep. op. Ouguergouz, J., para. 27). Here, the plain language of the provision
shows that a declaration may be made "at the time of ratification or any time thereafter" (id,
emphasis added). Furthermore, nothing in the Protocol prevents a state from granting such
consent "in a manner other than through the optional declaration" (id., para. 29). As Senegal
had not entered such a declaration upon ratification, it could consent afterwards, upon receipt
of Yogogombaye's application for example, and in whatever form it chose, including by letter
to the Court (id., para. 28).
The judgment ought to have comprehensively developed this reasoning (sep. op.
Ouguergouz, J., para. 37; Yogogombaye, para. 37). This is particularly so considering the
possibility that, besides filing an Article 34(6) declaration and other formal ways of indi-
cating consent, Senegal's acceptance of jurisdiction might have reflected forum pro roga-
tum-"the acceptance of the jurisdiction of an international Court by a State after the sei-
zure of this Court by another State or an individual, and this either, expressly or tacitly,
20101 625
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through decisive acts or an unequivocal behavior" (sep. op. Ouguergouz, J., para. 32).
judge Ouguergouz explained that, under this doctrine, effective participation in proceed-
ings by addressing the merits of a case, for example, could be taken to imply a tacit endorse-
ment of jurisdiction (id., para. 31).
In this case, until April 9, 2009, when Senegal finally filed its "statement of defence," the
possibility remained that it would step through the Court door and accept jurisdiction (sep.
op. Ouguergouz, J., paras. 32-34, 37-38; Yogogombaye, para. 12). Senegal's correspondence,
failure to immediately and unequivocally contest jurisdiction, and general attitude were sug-
gestive of this outcome (sep. op. Ouguergouz, J.' paras. 18 -20,38). However, once it filed pre-
liminary objections to Yogogombaye's application and showed that jurisdictional consent was
not forthcoming, the judges had to comply with Rule 52(7, which requires the Court to give
reasons for ruling on preliminary objections (id, para. 36). But for Senegal's filing, a simple
order or letter issued by the Court registry would have sufficed to dispose of the application
(id, para. 38).
By importing the doctrine of forum pro rogatum, which is well established in the jurispru-
dence of the International Court ofJustice (ICJ) ,24Judge Ouguergouz revealed how the judges'
disposition might have opened the jurisdictional door slightly wider. Essentially, based on the
Court's liberal handling of its first case, he implied that even where a particular African country
has not filed a prior declaration accepting the Court's competence to automatically hear human
rights applications, an individual (and presumably qualified NGOs) may still initiate a case
against a state party. Such a case would be rendered admissible if the respondent state submits
to the Court's jurisdiction-whether explicitly or implicitly- by, for example, appearing to
contest the merits.
The question that then arises is how to treat future applications, especially in the face of
widespread uncertainty as to which African states have lodged the optional declaration.
According to Judge Ouguergouz, the Court must verify that it has jurisdiction over a particular
case before listing it (sep. op. Ouguergouz, J., para. 40). Drawing on the ICJ practice before
July 1978, he suggested a new administrative procedure. If an initial review reveals that the
Court has jurisdiction, a complaint would be placed on the general list; however, if it appears
that the respondent state has not entered the Article 34(6) declaration, the application would
be rejected through a simple letter issued by the Court registry. In his view, the application
"could eventually be communicated to the State Party concerned" (id., emphasis added). It is
only if and when such a state party accepts the Court's jurisdiction that the case would then
be listed and notified to all other states parties and relevant AU organs-as required by the Pro-
tocol and pertinent rules (id.).
This hypothetical discussion might be academically satisfying. But it is probably confusing
for prospective applicants. The separate opinion made an important contribution by elabo-
rating the Court's liberal approach to jurisdiction in this maiden case. However, with the pro-
posal of this new limitation based on ICJ practice, Judge Ouguergouz followed a line of rea-
soning with more detail and hypothesis than is probably tied to the conclusion of the judgment.
"4 Certain Questions ofMutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), paras. 60-63 (Int'l Ct. JusticeJune
4, 2008). Materials for this and other cases are available on the ICJ's Web site, http://www.icj-cij.org. Given the
ICJ's experience, where only a limited set of cases have successfully based jurisdiction on this doctrine, it seems
unlikely that the African Court will receive a flood of cases anytime soon. Any such use of the doctrine will have
to address the underlying state consent issue that inevitably arises.
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He rationalized that the limitation would "avoid giving untimely or undue publicity" to indi-
vidual applications over which the Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction (sep. op. Ouguergouz,
J., para. 40).
This approach appears problematic for at least two reasons. First, as far as human rights cases
are concerned, unlike state-to-state disputes, such as those before the ICJ, it is precisely such
timely publicity that could shame a state into accepting judicial competence to hear a com-
plaint. Second, the very essence offobrumprorogatum is to afford the applicant a chance- oth-
erwise unavailable-to confront the respondent state. Thus, for this jurisdictional trigger to
even be remotely plausible in the context of a human rights court, the complaint must nec-
essarily be transmitted to the concerned state.
The object and purpose of the Protocol suggest that other African states and AU organs
should also be notified of such applications. At that stage, from the Court's perspective, no fur-
ther action need be taken on the complaint. This process makes sense, particularly for judicial
efficiency. Depending on the facts of the case, notifying AU organs or other states parties could
give them the impetus to bring relevant pressures to bear for the state party to accede to juris-
diction. The impugned state would then be free to respond in whatever way it chooses: to
accept the Court's competence over individual/NGO complaints generally by filing a decla-
ration with the depository of the treaty; by submitting a letter endorsing jurisdiction with
respect to the specific case before the Court; by formally contesting the merits of the complaint
(thereby seizing the Court ofjurisdiction throughforumprorogatum); or perhaps mote likely,
by filing a brief raising preliminary objections to jurisdiction.
On a much broader level, this first judgment is significant because of the underlying issue
that it addresses: Senegal's delay in trying Habr6 for his alleged crimes. While Yogogombaye's
characterization of the facts is misleading,25 the underlying issues reached the ICJ in February
2009, when Belgium initiated a case against Senegal, alleging that it had violated its obligations
to prosecute or extradite the former Chadian president under the Convention Against Tor-
ture.26 It also requested an order for provisional measures, which has since been denied . 2 7 This
judgment is therefore not the last we will hear of Habr6's alleged actions. Interestingly, perhaps
because of that ongoing litigation, Senegal rejected the African Court's jurisdiction over
Yogogombaye's application. Strategically, in view of the slowness of ICJ proceedings and the
25 See, e.g., Decision on the Hiss~ne Habr6 Case and theAfrican Union, Doc. AssemblylAUl3 (VII), para. 5 (July
1-2,2006) (mandating Senegal to ensure Habr~ was tried, on behalfofAfrica, by acompetent courtwith guarantees
of a fair trial); AU Report of the Committee of Eminent African jurist on the Case of Hissene Habr6 (2006), at
http://www.hrw.orgjusice/habre/CEJA.ReporO5O6.pdf; see also Mandiaye Niang, The Senegalese Legal Frame-
work for the Prosecution ofinternational Crimes, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1047, 1048 (2009) (noting that the Habr6
case has been both a "catalyst and litmus test" for Senegal, and arguing that the failure to prosecute arose at least
partially from the lacunae in the domestic legal framework criminalizing international crimes). For a discussion of
AU policy on universal jurisdiction and the related African government critique of the International Criminal
Court, see Charles C. Jal loh, Universal jurisdiction, Universal Prescriptio n? A Preliminary Assessment of the African
Union Perspective on UniversalJurisdiction, 21 CRim. L.F. 1 (20 10); and Charles C. Jalloh, Regionalizing Interna-
tional Criminal Law? 9 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 445 (2009).
" Application Instituting Proceedings (BeIg. v. Sen.) (Int'l Ct. Justice Feb. 19, 2009); see also Convention
Against Torture, supra note 10, Arts. 7(l), 30 (imposing an obligation on states parties to prosecute or extradite,
and a duty for disputing parties to refer disputes over alleged noncompliance to the ICJ).
27 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Provisional Measures (Int'l Ct.
justice May 28, 2009).
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reality that the AU asked Senegal to prosecute Habr6 on behalf of Africa, one must wonder
whether it might not have served the country better to secure a ruling from this regional court . 2 8
Finally, this first judgment is a major disappointment to advocates of the Court who have
waited for years to gain a glimpse into the added value that it will bring to human rights pro-
tection in Africa. The judges did not engage substantive human rights at all; rather, they got
bogged down in discussions of locus standi and internal procedures. It is to be hoped that the
next few cases will present the Court an opportunity to adjudicate substantive allegations of
human rights violations by an African state. That is the only way it will establish its credibility,
and help to move the African human rights system into the developed and effective category.
CHARLES CHERNORJAILOH
University ofPittsburgh School ofLaw
European Convention on Human Rights- exhaustion of domestic remedies- effectiveness of domestic
remedies
DEMOPOULOS & OTHERS v. TURKEY (ADMISSIBILITY). App. Nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02,
13466/03, 14163/04, 10200/04, 19993/04, 21819/04. At http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/.
European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), March 1, 20 10.
The applicants in Demopoulos v. Turkey,' all Cypriot nationals of Greek Cypriot origin,
claimed to own immovable property in the northern part of Cyprus. They complained mainly
under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights' (Convention)
that they had been deprived of their property in northern Cyprus, which is under the control
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). None of the applicants had made an
application to the Immovable Property Commission (IPC) for restitution or compensation in
respect of their property. The IPC, established pursuant to Law 67/2005 enacted by the TRNC
Parliament, can examine and reach decisions on applications brought by all natural and legal
persons claiming rights to immovable or movable property in northern Cyprus.' The Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that (1) the IPC procedure may be
regarded as part of the domestic remedies of Turkey, and (2) the IPC provides accessible and
effective redress to Greek Cypriots for violations of their property rights. The Court accord-
ingly rejected the present applications for nonexhaustion of domestic remedies.
In setting forth its framework for considering the case, the Court observed that the Con-
vention is designed to "guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are
practical and effective" (para. 82).' The Court noted that the arguments of the parties reflected
the long-standing dispute between Cyprus and Turkey, and that the present case was burdened
2" Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Beig. v. Sen.), Order (Int'l Ct. Justice July 9,
2009) (setting timeline for written pleadings and deadline for Senegal's counter-memorial as July 11, 2011).
' Demopoulos v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 14163/04, 10200/04, 19993/
04, & 21819/04, Admissibility (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 1, 2010). The judgments and decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights, as well as its basic texts, are available at <http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/>.
2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 5,
213 UNTS 222.
3 The Web site of the Immovable Property Commission is at http://www.northcyprusipc.org.
4 Citing, e.g., Folgero, v. Norway, App. No. 15472/02, Merits & just Satisfaction, para. 100 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 2007); Salduz v. Turkey, App. No. 36391/02, Merits & Just Satisfaction, para. 51 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008).
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